Category: Hungary

On 1 October 2023, the amendments of the new Land Registry Act entered into force and as a result, the Act will enter into force only on 1 October 2024, instead of the date of 1 February 2024 already postponed from the initial date of 1 February 2023.

The “E-Land Registry” project is ongoing and nearing completion, aiming at developing the land register into an electronic database. The purpose of the new legislation is to ensure electronic administration, including automatic decision-making in land administration. Between 1 October 2024 and 3 December 2024, certain provisions of the new Land Registry Act relating to electronic administration will apply only if the submission was made through the Land Registry IT system and mandatory electronic administration will be required from 4 December 2024.

On the basis of the reasoning of the amendments, in recent times, various professional bodies, organisations and chambers have approached the Prime Minister’s Office requesting that the new electronic land registry system be introduced gradually instead of an immediate implementation. The respondents argued that a complete overhaul of a decades-old practice linked to land registration at a single point in time would have a high risk and would create considerable tensions in society. The gradual introduction will ensure that the “external” clients (i.e. the legal representatives) of the land registry will be able to use a properly functioning IT system after adequate training and knowledge. Furthermore, the advantage of a phased introduction is that the new infrastructure can be put in place with a gradual workload, that any problems that may arise during the introduction are not national in scope, and that the continuity of the so-called business continuity, and thus the continuity of the real estate transactions, can be ensured.

By Lidia Suveges, Attorney at law, KCG Partners Law Firm

On 5 October 2023, the Government adopted a new decision according to which it will review the current regulation on the entry, residence and employment of third-country nationals in Hungary with the aim of tightening the statutory provisions in this respect.

Earlier this year, the Parliament adopted an act on the employment of guest workers which would have allowed the employment of third-country nationals by temporary work agencies in a simplified procedure and was scheduled to come into force on 1 November 2023. However, the Government revoked this act and set itself the objective to elaborate a new stricter regulation.

The Government said that to protect the Hungarian workers, it is necessary to establish new grounds for the regulation on the employment of third-country nationals. According to the Government’s decision, the new bill will make it clear that in Hungary temporary residence and employment are only permitted for specific purposes, under specific statutory conditions with the approval of the state. The Government justified its decision by stating that in order to protect Hungarian families, vacant positions should be filled with Hungarian job seekers and foreign third-country workers can only be employed if Hungarian workers are no longer available for the position. Currently, there is no information on when the new legislation will enter into force.

By Eszter Ila-Horvath, Attorney at Law, KCG Partners Law Firm

Lakatos Koves & Partners has advised Bristol-based industrial thread manufacturer Coats on the sale of its thread factory in Ujpest, Hungary.

According to LKT, the predecessor of the Ujpest thread factory was founded in 1923 and, under various names, was one of the dominant companies in the Hungarian textile industry during the 20th century. Coats purchased the factory in the privatization process in 1990, with the plant resuming its original activities.

Coats is a manufacturer of thread and structural components for apparel and footwear and develops performance materials.

According to the firm, Coats has factories in various countries around the world, with the Coats Magyarország Kft. operation in Hungary having “played a very important role throughout the last decades.” However, the company decided to move its production operations from Hungary to Romania.

The LKT team was led by Partner Attila Ungar and Senior Lawyer Katalin Losonci and included Junior Lawyer Fanni Balas.

The Hungarian Labour Code specifies that the dismissal by the employer may be in relation to the behaviour of the employee, but it does not specify exactly what kind of behaviours can be considered. The question arises as to whether the employer can define the possible reasons for termination in its own regulations, if so, can the termination be based solely on the violation of the internal regulations? In our article, we analyse this question based on the recent decision of the Supreme Court.

Facts

The claimant worked as a project manager at the defendant. Pursuant to her labour contract, she was obliged to comply with the provisions of the law, the university regulations, and the “Code of Ethics and Behaviour” of the defendant.

During her employment, the claimant sent an e-mail message to her colleagues from her work e-mail address, informing the recipients that she was 12 weeks pregnant, and due to her high-risk pregnancy, she was saying goodbye to her colleagues.

In the e-mail, the claimant made insulting and personal comments to her colleagues (the message is quoted in the decision, which can be an important reference for similar cases. Due to its obscenity, it is not quoted in this article.)

After learning about the email, the defendant terminated the claimant’s employment with immediate effect.

According to the justification, in the email, the employee made seriously defamatory statements and opinions regarding both her colleagues and the management of the defendant, which is unacceptable in a workplace. The style and manner of the letter are incompatible with the Catholic ethos of the defendant, with the ethical rules recorded in its mission statement and internal regulations, which were expressly acknowledged by the claimant.

The claimant stated in her claim that her employment was terminated wrongfully. She argued that the justification did not reveal what rule she had violated, the notion of “catholic ethos” cannot be interpreted in legal sense, and that the employer has misused its rights to prevent her from expressing her opinion.

The defendant emphasized that the Claimant’s letter, especially the parts cited in the notice of dismissal, violated the relevant provisions of the Code of Ethics, and there was no need to give a more detailed justification.

First and second instance judgement

The first instance court rejected the claim.

The court considered that in her email, the claimant spoke in a particularly insulting, hurtful, condescending, and degrading manner. The use of specific words and slangs strengthens the weight of defamatory terms. The court shared the defendant’s argument that the style and manner used by the claimant are incompatible with the defendant’s internal regulations, mission statement, and the Catholic ethos of the university.

The claimant submitted appeal against the judgment. The second instance court upheld the judgment of the first instance court as it agreed with its findings.

The claimant submitted request for judicial review, in which she requested the annulment of the judgment of the first instance court and the adoption of a decision corresponding to her claim. According to her, among other things, the courts did not examine the reasonableness of the justification of the termination.

The decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court found the request for review unfounded.

The Supreme Court found that the first and second instance courts clearly stated that the claimant’s statements violated the general ethical expectations of the university as well as the relevant internal regulations.

The statement of reasons is considered clear in case the employer refers to the violation of the rules contained in internal regulations, e.g. the Code of Ethics.

The Supreme Court concluded that the immediate termination of the employment relationship is lawful if the employee’s behaviour during communication with colleagues is incompatible with the expectations contained in the employer’s internal regulations known to the employee.

Comment

Violation of the employer’s internal regulations by the employee, including the code of ethics, could already be the basis for termination by the employer based on previous judicial practice. On the one hand, the recent decision confirmed the previous practice, and also made it clear that the violation of the code of ethics can be the basis not only for ordinary dismissal, but also for immediate dismissal, which is considered the most serious sanction. Due to the case law system developing in Hungary, the decision can be cited as a precedent in similar cases in the future.

(In the article, we analysed Supreme Court Decision published under No. “BH 2023.10.250”)

By Peter Gritta, Attorney-at-law, SmartLegal Schmidt & Partners

In recent months, the focus on artificial intelligence shifted to generative pre-trained transformers that rely on large language models, and tools, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT or Google’s Bard, as they became widely available to the public.

GPTs are AI models specifically trained to understand and generate human-like text and process vast amounts of textual data. With recent developments of LLMs came the phenomenon of “emergent abilities.”

Emergent abilities are unintended capabilities of LLMs that are not pre-trained into the AI model. According to ChatGPT, “emergent abilities in generative AI models refer to the unexpected or novel capabilities that arise from the training and operation of these models. While generative AI models are initially trained to learn patterns and generate content based on existing data, they can sometimes exhibit behaviors or produce outputs that were not explicitly programmed or anticipated by their creators. These emergent abilities can be both beneficial and potentially concerning.”

Emergent abilities may include creativity and deepfakes, style transfer, improving existing content and work, and language understanding. For instance, an LLM may start understanding languages other than those it was initially trained for. Such emergent abilities may surface during the training phase of the AI model, and probably during the operational, production phase of the model, if it is set for continuous improvement, such as learning from the actual interactions the model has with human beings and other IT systems. 

While the development and use of AI has many legal and ethical aspects and implications, securing the privacy rights and freedoms of data subjects while creating, training and using GPTs is a key consideration. AI technologies are developing rapidly, and the current legal framework typically consists of intellectual property (copyright, know-how and other proprietary rights), data protection, and information security-related regulations. 

The EU General Data Protection Regulation sets the current applicable data protection requirements. The question may then arise: if emergent abilities are inherently vested in LLMs, does their emergence qualify as further use under the current provisions of applicable EU data protections laws? 

The term “further use” is not defined in the GDPR. Under the regulation, “further use” means the processing of personal data for a different purpose than it was originally collected, like collecting contact data for maintaining customer relationships and later using the same data for marketing purposes or training a machine learning model.

The GDPR also says, the “further use” of personal data is allowed only, if the original purpose and the further use purpose are compatible with each other. Such compatibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, which could be difficult in practice in the case of LLMs, as even developers may be surprised by models’ actual abilities. Also, to determine the compatibility of purposes, data controllers must consider any link between the different purposes, the context of personal data collection, the nature of personal data, potential consequences of further use on data subjects, and application of appropriate technical controls.

In our view, a link may be easily established, as some emergent abilities may not require a processing purpose different from the original. Also, the context of personal data collection is similar, while the nature of personal data is pre-set by the controller (collecting training and validation data). However, in real life situations this may not always be the case. Further, the assessment of potential consequences may be very difficult due to the black box-like, opaque nature of AIs. The ultimate solution may still be obtaining consent from affected data subjects, but in practice this may seem cumbersome and largely ineffective.

Potentially affecting the development and use of GPTs in real-life scenarios will be the EU’s AI Act. One of its main goals is to develop and create a technology neutral regulatory framework for the development, use and provision of high-risk AI systems within the EU. Due to recent developments and the publicity about GPTs, especially ChatGPT, the AI Act now also refers to generative AI models.

According to the European Parliament, “Generative foundation models, like GPT, would have to comply with additional transparency requirements, like disclosing that the content was generated by AI, designing the model to prevent it from generating illegal content and publishing summaries of copyrighted data used for training.”

While the draft regulation specifically addresses generative AI technologies, it is silent about LLM’s emergent abilities and the treatment of any potential risks that may relate to them.

However, the AI Act would require the implementation and operation of certain risk management procedures and means in cases of high-risk AI systems. In the draft, high-risk AI system are operated in the areas of biometric identification and categorisation of natural persons; management and operation of critical infrastructure; education and vocational training; employment, workers management and access to self-employment; access to and enjoyment of essential private services and public services and benefits; law enforcement; migration, asylum and border control management; and administration of justice and democratic processes.

It seems GPTs will likely not qualify as high-risk AI systems under the EU’s proposed AI Act, but the obligations on generative AI mainly concern transparency, including disclosing that the content was generated by AI, designing the model to prevent it from generating illegal content, and publishing summaries of copyrighted data used for training. 

It is likely the provisions of the GDPR shall remain applicable and data controllers must assess on a case-by-case basis if any emergent ability within LLMs qualify as further use and would violate the purpose limitation principle. If yes, such emergent ability may mean that a data processing purpose is incompatible with the original purpose and therefore, it would require further compliance related actions from the controller [e.g., obtaining consent from affected data subjects].

Conclusion

AI’s emergent abilities are a double-edged sword, offering both incredible potential and substantial challenges. Embracing these abilities while addressing associated risks and uncertainties requires a multi-disciplinary approach that combines technological innovation, ethical considerations, and responsive regulation. It’s essential to carefully navigate this evolving landscape to harness the benefits of AI’s emergent abilities while safeguarding privacy, ethics, and societal well-being.

By Adam Liber and Tamas Bereczki, Partners, Provaris

CMS has advised the Hungarian branch of Panattoni on a dual built-to-suit contract to develop two manufacturing facilities in Debrecen and Kecskemet, covering 30,000 square meters, for a German automotive supplier. Noerr reportedly advised the counterparty.

Panattoni is a European industrial property developer.

According to CMS, the Debrecen project involves a state-of-the-art 13,700-square-meter factory, with construction commencing in September 2023, and an anticipated handover by October 2024. The tenant is scheduled for early access in the second quarter of 2024.

The Kecskemet facility, spanning 16,600 square meters, will see its ground-breaking in October 2023, otherwise following the same schedule as the Debrecen project in terms of completion and early access.

The CMS team included Partner Gabor Czike, Senior Counsel Andras Klupacs, and Senior Associate Laszlo Jokay.

Editor’s Note: After this article was published, Noerr confirmed its participation to CEE Legal Matters. The firm’s team included Partner Zoltan Nadasdy and Senior Associate Eszter Hegedus.

There is no doubt that the coronavirus pandemic was a fundamental shock to the Hungarian economy. Many business operators have tried to reduce their losses by terminating contracts, referring to the coronavirus as force majeure cause and there have now been more court decisions in such cases. A recent one deals with the question whether a long-term framework contract may be terminated because of the impossibility of the performance, invoking the coronavirus as a force majeure.

Facts

In February 2020, the claimant, a workforce supplier entered into a framework contract with the defendant who operates baths and spas in Hungary, based on which the claimant provided temporary work agency services. The defendant undertook to use 280 000 man-hours of labor during the 24-month term of the contract and he had the option to extend the period of the contract for a further 24 months.

The parties excluded the possibility of the ordinary termination of the contract; however, the defendant could terminate the contract based on special reasons provided by the public procurement act. The defendant undertook to pay penalty for non-performance.

In February 2020, the COVID pandemic began to spread widely in Europe. In March 2020 the defendant closed its baths and spas. In May 2020 the defendant terminated the framework contract claiming that because of the COVID pandemic, it currently has no income from ordinary business activities and does not need temporary work agency services. Soon after the termination of the contract, the defendant reopened several of its baths.

First and second instance judgement

The claimant sued the defendant for penalty for non-performance (alternatively for damages) given that in its view, the termination of the contract by the defendant was unlawful.

The first instance court upheld the claimant’s action for penalty. In the court’s view at the time of the termination, the evolution of the COVID infection rate was not predictable and the defendant could not have foreseen the time, duration of the restrictions on the opening of bathing areas. The defendant had at least 21 months and possibly 24 more to use the claimant’s services, thus it terminated the contract prematurely, without waiting to see how the pandemic would affect its activities and the performance of the contract during its term.

Surprisingly, the second instance court completely dismissed the claimant’s action. According to the court, the targeted legal effect of the parties’ contract was relevant which was to satisfy the defendant’s demand for seasonal extra labor over and above the existing workforce. Given that the COVID as force majeure and its consequences such as the closing of bathing areas made it impossible for the parties to achieve their contractual objective and to perform the contract, it was terminated. Since the performance become impossible because of force majeure occurred after the conclusion of the contract, the defendant is not liable for the failure of the performance and cannot be obligated to pay the penalty.

The decision of the Supreme Court

Based on the claimant’s request for judicial review, the Supreme Court repealed the final judgement and ordered the second instance court for retrial.

In the Supreme Court’s view, the second instance court erred in finding that it was impossible for the defendant to perform the contract for the whole of the remaining 280 000 man-hours of work. First, the framework nature of the contract, the flexibility and the fact that the defendant could use the workforce during the whole 24 months of the contract term is relevant. Second, it cannot be deduced from the content of the contract that the defendant intended to cover its seasonal (extra) labour needs, and this contradicts to the earlier contractual practice referred to by the claimant, based on which the defendant used the claimant’s services not only in the high season but during the whole year.

According to the Supreme Court, the impossibility of performance implies the definitive non-performance of the contractual service and in addition to the finality, the complete impossibility of performance of the contractual services is also relevant. It is undisputable that the COVID pandemic and the related government measures influenced the defendant’s operation and workforce needs but the temporary closures of the bathing areas could not have caused the impossibility of the performance of the entire contract, taking into account the framework nature of the contract and the defendant’s loose drawdown obligation which could be activated at any time and to any extend during the contractual term.

Based on the above the second instance court shall examine whether the failure to draw down the remaining man-hours by the defendant may be excused and whether the mitigation of the penalty may arise.

Comment

The above decision of the Supreme Court shows that the COVID pandemic and the related government measures may be considered as force majeure cause. However, they cannot cause the automatic termination of a flexible long-term framework contract as the Supreme Court maintained its previous practice based on which the impossibility of performance implies the definitive and total non-performance of the contractual service.

By Anita Vereb, Attorney-at-law, SmartLegal Schmidt & Partners

Szabo Kelemen & Partners Andersen Attorneys Managing Partner Tamas Szabo has stepped down from his Managing Partner position after almost 30 years. Taking Szabo’s place in the firm’s four-person leadership team is Partner Balazs Dominek, who became a Managing Partner at Andersen Legal earlier this year.

Dominek joined Laszlo Kelemen, Domonkos Kiss, and Peter Vincze on the firm’s four Managing Partner team. Dominek first became part of the Andersen Legal in Hungary team in 2010, joining the Szabo, Kelemen & Partners law firm as a Legal Trainee. He became an Attorney at Law in 2015 and later a Partner. He specializes in competition law and M&A, as well as administrative law and related litigation.

Szabo will continue his work at the firm as a Senior Partner. According to the firm, he will support the Managing Partners and “they will continue to rely on his expertise and decades of experience in this new role. The goal of the transformation is to include a representative of the next generation of lawyers in the management of the office, while Tamas Szabo wishes to focus on professional work and client service, whilst stepping back from management duties. Accordingly, as a member whose name is in the company’s name, he will continue to represent the clients of the office as an active lawyer in the areas of his practice.”

Anyone who has seen venture capital investments has probably encountered the expressions “vesting” or “reverse vesting”.

Vesting, taken from the Anglo-Saxon practice, is an instrument also established in continental legal systems. Vesting may be summarized as a ‘gradual share allowance’.

The essence of vesting is to ensure (i) the active participation of the founders in the target company for a specified period of time (the vesting period), and make them committed to the realization of the project. In case of classic vesting the founder acquires the shares in certain instalments during the vesting period, as agreed by the parties, usually in the investment and shareholders agreement.

Reverse vesting, on the other hand, reverses the timeline and formula of the above, i.e., the founder acquires all of his shares at the beginning of the cooperation with the caveat that if he becomes a ‘leaver’ (abandons the project or leaves the target company) within the vesting period, he loses a proportional part of his shares.

The reverse vesting rules may generally apply to founders already being members of the company at the time of the investment, however, in practice, reverse vesting is generally applied to people who join the project later.

In the Hungarian legal system, reverse vesting may be enforced by establishing a fixed-period call option right. Let us use a simple example: When concluding the investment agreement, the parties agree on a four-year vesting for the given founder. According to their agreement, if the founder becomes a leaver within one year from the date of signature, the option holder (the investor, or the target, as agreed in the investment agreement) may acquire 100% of the founder’s shares. The proportion of the shares potentially affected by the call option right is reduced to 75% after one year but within two years, to 50% between years 2-3 and  to 25% between years 3-4.

In case of limited liability companies, the enforceability of reverse vesting before January 1, 2022, was a contentious point, as neither the scientific literature nor the judicial practice was consistent on whether it was necessary to divide the business quota, and whether this division required the consent of the quotaholders’ meeting in case only a certain proportion of the shares are concerned with the reverse vesting – e.g. leaving after one year in the above example.

According to a possible interpretation, if no more business units are created, i.e. the members transfer a business quota among themselves, it cannot be considered as division of the quota. According to an alternative interpretation however, a division occurs, but the consent of the members’ meeting is not required as the business quota may be transferred between the members without any restrictions. Based on a third interpretation, the relevant case presumes a division of the business quota, in which case – in the absence of a different provision of the Civil Code – the consent of the members’ meeting is required.

The willingness of the founder, concerned with the reverse vesting, to cooperate made the situation even more complicated. It is easy to understand that if such founder was willing to cooperate, the issues above would not have manifested because the quotaholders could decide on the appropriate division of the founder’s business quota and its transfer supported with the founder’s vote. However, without such cooperation, together with the dogmatic uncertainties above, the enforcement of reverse vesting became enormously problematic.

On January 1, 2022,  the amended Civil Code has addressed these issues and now stipulates that a member of a limited liability company may have more than one capital contribution, therefore, more than one business quota.

Based on the amendment, the investors now have the opportunity to require (and enforce) the division of the founders’ quota in accordance with the vesting period and the specific vesting rules, and may establish a call option right for a sufficient period of time on the quotas.

By Gabor Bebok, Partner, and Peter Ruff, Senior Associate, Pontes Budapest, Pontes

In June 2023 Hungary introduced a new ground for annulling construction arbitration awards, which applies where arbitrators fail to deliberate the opinion of the Performance Certification Expert Body. Will this amendment affect so negatively Hungarian construction arbitrations as believed by many commentators? This article argues that paradoxically, the new law can even strengthen the position of arbitration as alternative dispute resolution method in construction matters.

New Ground for Setting Aside Construction Arbitration Awards

With effect from 5 June 2023, the Hungarian legislator introduced a new ground for setting aside arbitral awards.  According to the new Section 47 (2) bc) of the Arbitration Act, the court may set aside an arbitral award in case it considers that the tribunal failed to assess in its award the opinion of the Performance Certification Expert Body (PCEB) exhibited by either party, including the reasons for its assessment or exclusion as evidence.

The new ground for setting aside cannot be opted-out of, it shall be applied in “ongoing cases”. and it can be examined by the court ex officio, similarly to the breach of public policy or non-arbitrability of the dispute.

An awkward legislative step in a Model Law jurisdiction

In the field of arbitration Hungary is a so-called “Model Law jurisdiction” since it harmonized its arbitration law with the UNCITRLAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1994 and in 2017.

Since the provisions of the UNCITRLAL Model Law relative to the grounds of setting aside of arbitral awards were carefully harmonized with Article V of the New York Arbitration Convention, it cannot be disputed that deviating from this unified legal framework is an awkward legislative step in a model law jurisdiction, like Hungary. At the same time, the fears in relation with the potential effects of the new law are at least partially unfounded.

Fewer Surprise Decisions

In case PCEB-based litigations and arbitration are compared, an asymmetric legal regime had been in place for PCEB opinion-based construction disputes in Hungary until the recent amendment.

On the one hand, the asymmetric regime allowed arbitral tribunals to fully disregard a PCEB opinion, by rendering an award even without mentioning it, without any consequence. On the other hand, in a PCEB-based litigation the same amounted to a substantial procedural breach, justifying new first instance court proceedings.

Watching the above asymmetry from the perspective of the users of dispute resolution services, it is easy to see that under the former regime the risk of surprise decisions was higher in case of PCEB-based arbitral proceedings than in PCEB-based litigations.

If there is something which can deter parties from arbitration it is certainly the risk of a so-called surprise award, rendered in a case which was started based on a supporting PCEB opinion, and which was finally lost by the claimant for unknown reasons.

Since for the users of dispute resolution, arbitration is always an alternative to state court litigation, it is easy to see that the recent amendment, trying to eliminate “surprise arbitral awards” rather strengthens the status of the former.

More Well-Reasoned Arbitral Awards

From the perspective of a would-be arbitral tribunal, the new law does not seem to be so dangerous. A prudent arbitral tribunal that faces a PCEB opinion exhibited by any party during the proceedings will presumably give at least some reasons in the award for accepting or disregarding it as evidence.

Since the reasons given by the tribunal, be they logical or not, cannot be reviewed by the annulment court, the new provision will not be a real threat for arbitrators who find the time to draft a well-reasoned award.

The Role of the European Convention in cross-border cases

When it comes to the recognition and enforcement of Hungarian arbitral awards abroad, the picture is not as daunting as some commentators points out, since the European Arbitration Convention considerably narrows down the grounds for rejecting the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by reason of being set aside in the country of origin.

According to the European Arbitration Convention, the grounds that can be considered as basis of annulment of the foreign award by the state court acting in the recognition and enforcement phase are almost the same, like the grounds in Article V (1) of the New York Convention.  Of course, the failure of deliberating a PCEB opinion is not on that list.

Situated in the heart of Europe, the most important commercial partners of Hungary are states that are also parties to the European Convention. In these jurisdictions, the potential annulment of the Hungarian award based on the new law cannot be relied on as an obstacle for recognition and enforcement.

Potential Retroactive Effect – Not a Real Risk

Last but not least, some critics highlighted the potential retroactive effect of the new law. It is true that the pure grammatical interpretation of the text opens the door for an expansive construction allowing the retroactive application of the new provision.

However based on the logical and systemic interpretation of the text, the better view is that arbitral awards rendered before 5 June 2023 cannot be set aside for not respecting a legal provision entering into force on that day.

Conclusion

To sum up the above, even if introducing a new ground for setting aside is an awkward step in a Model Law jurisdiction like Hungary, the amendment presumably will not cause problems in ongoing annulment proceedings. In addition, it will not be an obstacle to recognize and enforce Hungarian arbitral awards in jurisdictions that are parties to the European Convention.

When it comes to the potential positive effects, due to the new law, the risk of surprise arbitral decisions is decreased, and there will be presumably more well-reasoned arbitral awards in Hungarian construction arbitrations.  Is that such a big problem? I do not think so.

By Richard Schmidt, Managing Partner, Smartlegal Schmidt & Partners